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Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity
Eric A. Posner1
September 27, 2010
Abstract. Human rights law does not appear to enjoy as high a level of compliance as the
laws of war, yet is institutionalized to a greater degree. This paper argues that the reason
for this difference is related to the strategic structure of international law. The laws of war
are governed by a regime of reciprocity, which can produce self-enforcing patterns of
behavior, whereas the human rights regime attempts to produce public goods and is thus
subject to collective action problems. The more elaborate human rights institutions are
designed to overcome these problems but fall prey to second-order collective action
problems. The simple laws of war institutions have been successful because they can
exploit the logic of reciprocity. The paper also suggests that limits on military reprisals
are in tension with self-enforcement of the laws of war. The U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda
is discussed.

The Bush administration’s counterterror tactics provoked a great deal of criticism from
the standpoint of international law. However, the criticism in the United States and in other
countries differed in important respects. In foreign countries, particularly in Europe, critics
focused on violations of human rights norms, particularly those contained in the Convention
Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2 In the United
States, the debate centered on the Geneva Conventions. In statements issuing from the president,3
debates in Congress,4 legal memoranda produced by lawyers in the executive branch,5 and
judicial opinions,6 the laws of war received a great deal more attention than human rights law,
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which received hardly any attention at all. Commentators debated whether the methods of
coercive interrogation violated a domestic statute banning torture but paid little attention to the
Convention Against Torture.7
What accounts for these differences? One factor is that most foreign critics rejected the
premise that the United States was at war with Al Qaeda. If the United States and Al Qaeda were
not at war, then the Geneva Conventions did not come into play. Restrictions on U.S. treatment
of Al Qaeda could come only from international human rights law. But if that factor explains
why foreigners focused on human rights law, it does not explain why criticism based on the laws
of war received more attention in the United States than criticism based on human rights law.
In this paper, I argue that this difference is connected with the structure of international
law. At the heart of international law lies the phenomenon of reciprocity. States take
international law norms most seriously when the penalty for violating them is direct and
immediate retaliation from other states in the form of reciprocal violation of the same norms.
When international law has this structure, it is relatively robust. When it lacks this structure, it is
weak. I argue that the United States takes the law of war more seriously than human rights law
because the laws of war are reciprocally enforced, while human rights laws are not. There is a
further twist to this story in the context of the conflict with Al Qaeda. Because the United States
had no reason to believe that Al Qaeda (or any other organization or country) would retaliate if
the United States violated the laws of war in the conflict with Al Qaeda, it did not permit itself to
be constrained by those laws. This is why even the heightened concern about the Geneva
Conventions resulted in only partial compliance with them—and why the United States
disregarded the laws of war in the conflict with Al Qaeda while largely complying with them
(albeit with notable exceptions) in the simultaneous conflict with Iraq.
In Part I of this paper, I argue that the laws of war are enforced through reciprocity;
where reciprocity fails, violations occur. In part II, I argue that human rights treaties are not
enforced through reciprocity. Those treaties are best understood as efforts to overcome a
collective action problem on the part of a subset of liberal states, efforts that have largely failed,
albeit with some important exceptions. In part III, I further draw out the differences between the
two approaches by comparing their embodiment in international organizations. In part IV, I
return to U.S. policy in its conflict with Al Qaeda.
7
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I. The Laws of War
International humanitarian law, also known variously as the laws of war and jus in bello,
limits the methods, tactics, and activities of each side in a war. Rules require, among many others
things, that prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory be treated humanely; that the lives
and property of citizens of neutral states be respected; and that reasonable force be used against
targets. Hospitals and cultural sites cannot be attacked. Enemy soldiers accused of war crimes
must be given fair trials. Military forces must keep order and supply public services in occupied
areas. Truces must be respected.8 Another set of rules governs the types of weapons that can be
used, forbidding dum-dum bullets, certain types of fragmentary explosives, blinding lasers,
poison gas, and other weapons believed to be inhumane.9
Laws of war have always existed. In earlier times, they governed siege and the exchange
of hostages, as well as the treatment of civilians and captured soldiers. Up until the twentieth
century, states understood that violation of the laws of war would be met with retaliation. If one
belligerent slaughters POWs, then the other belligerent would respond by slaughtering its own
prisoners. If one belligerent ignored the rules of siege, the other belligerent would as well.10 In
the twentieth century, however, states agreed that reprisals would be limited.11 With a few
exceptions, states were no longer permitted to inflict collective punishment on the enemy.12
Retaliation was limited and legalized. States could capture enemy soldiers responsible for war
crimes, give them a fair trial, and punish them if they were convicted.
The laws of war have a simple economic explanation. When two states go to war, they
foresee an endpoint, which will typically involve certain concessions by one state—the transfer
of territory, monetary reparations, etc. Given that both states will end up at some new
equilibrium in terms of territory or wealth or power, it is best for both states if they can reach that
8
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equilibrium cheaply rather than expensively. The problem is that each state does individually
best if it uses harsh tactics, regardless how the other state acts. If the other state refrains from
using harsh tactics, then the first state obtains an advantage by using them. If the other state uses
harsh tactics, then the first state is put at a disadvantage if it does not use them. Yet both states
are better off if they both refrain from using harsh tactics than if they both use harsh tactics. For
example, each state does better by (for example) killing enemy prisoners than incurring the cost
of sheltering and feeding them, but both states are better off if POWs are protected than if they
are killed.13
The problem of harsh tactics has the structure of the familiar prisoner’s dilemma, and can
be solved through repeated play. The particular norms of jus in bello can be understood as
descriptions of the equilibrium outcomes; they provide focal points that minimize the risk that
cooperation breaks down because states misinterpret each other’s actions.14 Note that the law
does not constrain states in the same way that domestic law constrains citizens—through thirdparty enforcement. The law simply provides a script or protocol that states can choose to follow
or ignore. The cooperative outcome can be sustained only if each state credibly threatens to
retaliate in response to violations. Thus, the threat of noncompliance with the law must be everpresent. If one state knows that the other state will not retaliate, then the first state has every
incentive to violate the law itself. It follows that if one state does violate the rules, the other state
should violate the rules as well.
Putting aside cases where the laws of war require behavior that a state will engage in for
nonlegal reasons, a state will obey the laws of war only if the other state has the right incentives
to retaliate in response to a violation—which roughly means that it has a sufficiently low
discount rate (it values future payoffs). In addition, both states must receive high enough payoffs
from cooperating. Neither condition is necessarily satisfied. When wars are fought against states
or other entities that lack command structures that can control their soldiers, it may be impossible
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to sustain cooperation. And sometimes one side in a war may believe that the laws of war give
the other side an advantage. In that case, the disadvantaged party may refuse to comply with that
rule.
Anecdotal evidence provides some support for these hypotheses.15 States have always
selectively obeyed the laws of war. Before the twentieth century, European states and other
major powers would presumptively respect the laws of war in wars among themselves but not
wars with tribal groups (like American Indians or African tribes), pirates, “uncivilized” states,
and domestic insurgents. The latter groups themselves did not comply with the laws of war—
either because of lack of institutional capacity or because those laws, which were invented by
Europeans, favored organized armies. Even in conflicts among European states, the laws of war
eroded in circumstances where reciprocity became difficult or the laws ended up favoring one
side. The rules of siege warfare, for example, required the victorious belligerent in certain
conditions to release prisoners and allow them to return to home. This made less sense in the
wilderness, where soldiers could quickly melt into the forest and then rejoin their army, and was
abandoned on the American continent during the Seven Years War.
In the twentieth century, advances in the mechanization of warfare and the
professionalization of armies rendered irrelevant old rules governing siege, prize, neutrality, and
related matters.16 World War I saw extensive violation of these out-dated rules. Yet certain basic
norms, such as the humane treatment of POWs, were respected. In World War II, these rules
were respected on the western front but not on the eastern front. Their collapse on the eastern
front can be attributed to long supply lines and the massive number of prisoners who were
taken—both of these factors made it extremely costly to hold POWs in humane conditions. The
Nazis also regarded Russians as subhuman, and where one side launches a total war, the other
side has no reason to respect the laws of war. Similar factors may explain violations of the laws
of war by all sides in the Pacific theater.17 In the numerous post-World War II wars, the laws of
war were respected on an ad hoc basis. POWs were often but not always mistreated; poison gas
was used in the Egypt-Yemen and Iran-Iraq Wars, but not in the others. A prominent casualty
was the entire law of occupation, which no state ever acknowledged as a binding legal obligation
15
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until the second Iraq War.18 One possible explanation is that occupation is the end game; the
occupier no longer fears retaliation by the defeated or nearly defeated enemy.
It should be clear that reprisal never really went away, at least in the broad sense that
nations did not regard themselves as bound to laws of war that their enemies violated. Why not?
One hypothesis is that the restrictions on reprisals, if obeyed, prevent belligerents from
effectively retaliating when the other side violates the laws of war. The threat of prosecution of
war criminals is insufficient to deter violations because the probability that soldiers are captured
and tried is low. The law tries to address this problem by giving military superiors a legal
obligation to try and punish subordinates who violate the law of war. But enemy states have no
legal way to retaliate if the superiors fail to take this action—aside from taking diplomatic and
economic countermeasures not prohibited by international law. The superior faces a sanction
only in the unlikely event that he or she is captured by the enemy. But, unlike an ordinary
soldier, the superior will usually be far behind enemy lines.19 In order to deter law-of-war
violations, or to avoid being put at a disadvantage if they are not deterrable, belligerents acted in
reciprocal fashion rather than comply with the law.
In sum, reciprocity both explains why the laws of war are self-enforcing, and their limits.
Rules that make states jointly better off in one war but not in another war may be respected in the
first war but will not be respected in the second. Rules that make states jointly better off in one
theater but not another will also be respected in only the first theater. When the conditions for
reciprocity fail—as the war nears its end, when one belligerent does not have sufficient
institutional structure—the laws of war will not be respected. Finally, the laws regulating
reprisals failed because they interfered with the only effective mechanism for ensuring that the
laws were self-enforcing.
II. Human Rights
The modern international human rights regime began with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948. Although the UDHR did not create binding international law, subsequent
treaties fleshed out its general terms and incorporated them into international law binding on the
states that would ratify those treaties. These treaties include the International Covenant on Civil
18
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and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the
Genocide Convention, and the Convention Against Torture. The ICCPR recognized a standard
list of political and civil rights akin to those in the United States Bill of Rights, while the
ICESCR created rights to work, social security, health care, and the like. Other treaties protected
children, prohibited discrimination against women, minorities, and disabled people, and
established other rights.
Two schools of thought have arisen about the human rights treaties. The first holds that
human rights are moral universals, and the treaties, by incorporating human rights into law,
require states to abide by universal ideals. This school of thought draws on a long philosophical
and political tradition in the west, and continues to have considerable rhetorical and political
power, but it has foundered on philosophical disagreements about the nature of morality. Modern
moral philosophy has repudiated natural law thinking, the enterprise of deriving universal moral
ideals from human nature or the human condition.20
The second school of thought sees human rights treaties as serving political purposes.
These “agreement theories,” as Charles Beitz calls them, emphasize that human rights treaties
are law.21 States make law only when it serves their interests; therefore, human rights treaties
must serve their interest. According to agreement theories, human rights norms are simply those
on which all (or nearly all) governments can agree, reflecting the lowest common denominator
among their moral and political systems. If one state respects norms A, B, and C, while another
state respects norms C, D, and E, then only C can be regarded as a norm of human rights.
Neither approach quite captures the way that the idea of human rights plays out in
political and legal discussion. The first approach draws on international morality, but
international law rests on the consent of states and rejects appeals to morality. Because
international morality is highly contested, states prefer to rely on agreement as a basis for
international cooperation. The second approach, however, cannot account for the actual content
of international human rights treaties, which include many norms that are not universal. It also
assumes a puzzling scenario in which states commit only to comply norms that they already
observe; what is the point of that? When states criticize each other for violating human rights
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treaties, their debates often touch on profound disagreements about the content of human rights
norms.
The starting point for understanding international human rights law is the recognition that
the norms contained in human rights treaties do not in fact reflect an overlapping consensus—at
least if the human rights treaties are interpreted, as they normally are by western commentators,
as requiring norms of liberal democracy plus possibly a number of positive rights to medical
care, work, and the like.22 Developing states give priority, in varying degrees, to economic
growth, traditional values, and political order. We need a different approach to understanding
how human rights law might work.
Assume that states have preferences over a range of outcomes, which can include
altruistic as well as conventionally self-interested outcomes.23 The preferences of states reflect
the preferences of the general population, interest groups, or elites, as they emerge through
political institutions. If these groups care about the well-being of people in other countries, then
their preferences will be reflected in part in the state’s. States might also have instrumental
reasons for pursuing what otherwise seem like other-regarding goals. For example, states may
support human rights in other states because foreign states that respect human rights might be
less belligerent and more stable places for trade and investment.
States’ other-regarding interests, as I will call them, can differ considerably. One state
might care about the health of people living in foreign countries, while another state might care
about salvation of their souls. One state might believe that people living in other countries should
enjoy the benefits of a market economy, while another state might believe that those people
should benefit from education, health care, and social security. A state might be indifferent to the
well-being of people in other states as a general matter but draw the line at massacres or
genocide. Finally, the intensity of states’ other-regarding interests will vary. Many states have
highly intense preferences, and are willing to back them with substantial resources; other states
have weaker preferences.

22
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If, as seems likely, other-regarding preferences overlap, states’ efforts to help foreign
nationals face a collective action problem. As an example, imagine two states, say, the United
States and the European Union,24 which have an interest in improving the well-being of people
who live in third state, say, Zimbabwe. When the well-being of people in Zimbabwe improves,
the United States and the European Union are both made better off, in the sense that a “good” for
which they have preferences (for which they are willing to pay) has been supplied.
From the perspective of maximizing the joint welfare of the three countries, the United
States and the European Union should each contribute to Zimbabwe’s well-being. A simple
example will show why. Suppose that the United States and the European Union each have
wealth of 200, that Zimbabwe has wealth of 100, and that marginal utility of money is declining.
The jointly optimal distribution of wealth is one in which the three countries share equally: each
receives approximately 167. When the United States contributes one dollar to Zimbabwe, global
welfare increases, because Zimbabwe values its 101st dollar more than United States values its
200th dollar. The next dollar, however, should come from the European Union because the
European Union values its 200th dollar less than the United States values its 199th dollar. This
should continue until all countries have equal wealth.
Interdependent utility functions of this type lead to strategic dilemmas. If the United
States contributes to Zimbabwe’s well-being, the United States also thereby increases the
European Union’s utility. If the European Union contributes to Zimbabwe’s well-being, the
European Union increases the United States’ utility. But the United States and the European
Union have no desire to contribute to each other’s well-being. Thus, if they act unilaterally, they
will underfund Zimbabwe. They will do better if they can cooperate where each country agrees
to benefit the other country by donating to Zimbabwe.
I have so far spoken in terms of monetary contributions, and the analysis applies
straightforwardly to the contribution of financial aid to a poor country. But the analysis can also
be applied to more conventional types of human rights enforcement. Suppose that the
government of Zimbabwe practices torture. The United States and the European Union incur
disutility when Zimbabwe’s people are tortured, and so they are willing to contribute to reduce
the amount of torture. The United States’ and the European Union’s contributions now take the
form of costly actions—the cutting off of trade, diplomatic pressure, aid for retraining police,
24
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and so forth—that will reduce the amount of torture in Zimbabwe. The United States and the
European Union face the same strategic dilemma and jointly do best by cooperating.
We now need to examine Zimbabwe’s incentives. Zimbabwe’s government does not
respect human rights, for three possible reasons: (1) doing so interferes with the government’s
objectives (for example, to stay in power); (2) the government lacks capacity (for example,
poorly trained police); and (3) the public does not support the human rights in questions (for
example, equality for women in a traditional society). Accordingly, Zimbabwe will not respect
human rights unless other countries bribe it to, or other countries threaten to cause harm to it if it
does not.
Thus, there are two parallel games—one between the United States and the European
Union, the other between Zimbabwe and the joint venture of the United States and the European
Union, so to speak. We can apply the original repeated prisoner’s dilemma model to each of
these games.25
First, the United States contributes to the disciplining of Zimbabwe, conditional on the
European Union contributing to the disciplining of Zimbabwe. Thus, reciprocity underlies the
United States’ and the European Union’s cooperative effort to enforce human rights treaties
against Zimbabwe. If the United States and the European Union cooperate, then they will hold
out bribes and threats in order to influence Zimbabwe’s behavior. They might, for example, offer
to pay to retrain Zimbabwe’s police force, so that it stops using torture. Or they might threaten to
reduce trade or financial assistance if Zimbabwe fails to stop engaging in torture. Note in this
connection why it is crucial that the United States and the European Union cooperate with each
other. If the United States unilaterally reduces trade, then the European Union will take up the
slack, and Zimbabwe will be affected marginally or not at all.
Second, the United States and the European Union must jointly threaten Zimbabwe with
sanctions if Zimbabwe fails to cooperate by improving its treatment of its citizens. In each round
Zimbabwe must act by reducing or stopping torture; then the United States and the European
Union must react by refraining from issuing sanctions or otherwise maintaining benefits. If
25
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Zimbabwe continues to torture, then the United States and the European Union must cut off
benefits. Otherwise, Zimbabwe has no incentive to stop torturing its citizens.
As is always the case, there are multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, Zimbabwe does
not respect human rights because the United States and the European Union are not able to
cooperate in sanctioning it. In another equilibrium, Zimbabwe respects human right because the
United States and the European Union cooperate in sanctioning it. One can also imagine
alternatives: for example, the United States and the European Union cannot cooperate but each
does discipline Zimbabwe unilaterally if Zimbabwe fails to respect human rights. Their
independent efforts will be less than their coordinated efforts, so Zimbabwe’s improvement will
be less as well.
There are three reasons for being skeptical about the equilibrium in which Zimbabwe’s
human rights behavior improves. First, the United States and the European Union may not be
able to cooperate. In the real world outside our example, the rich states number in the dozens,
and as the number of parties increases, cooperation becomes more difficult. In addition, states
frequently disagree about when a human rights violator should be sanctioned, in part because the
states have different interests that they balance against the gains from improvement in human
rights. During the cold war, the United States refused to sanction human rights violators, such as
Guatemala, that were also western allies. After the cold war, the United States has refused to
sanction human rights violators, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that cooperate in the conflict
with Al Qaeda and peace efforts with Israel. Other countries, such as Sudan, receive support
from China, which has a strong interest in obtaining reliable suppliers of natural resources.
The basic problem of collective action is aggravated by philosophical and strategic rifts
between states otherwise committed to human rights. Europeans condemn the death penalty;
Americans do not. American insist on stronger protections on freedom of expression. The two
sides differ on how much importance should be given to economic and social rights. They have
different strategic interests which they sometimes permit to override their human rights
commitments. And then there are other powerful countries like China, Brazil, and Russia, which
have different values and interests. The targets of enforcement, countries like Zimbabwe, can
exploit these differences and undermine cooperation.26
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Second, the human rights violator itself may not be able to cooperate with the countries
that seek to change its behavior. Recall that cooperation requires a low discount rate. For
countries, this means political institutions that take account of future payoffs. But many human
rights violators have weak institutional capacity. Elected officials face coups; authoritarian
leaders act arbitrarily; bureaucracies are corrupt and cannot constrain leaders. In many cases, the
government has little power over local officials who commit human rights violations. In extreme
cases, such as Somalia, the government collapses and anarchy prevails.
Third, the United States and the European Union can compel Zimbabwe to improve
human rights only if they can credibly threaten to sanction Zimbabwe if it fails to do so.
However, threats to sanction are not always credible. Sanctions typically harm ordinary people
more than they harm leaders; indeed, sanctions work mainly by impelling ordinary people to
overthrow the government. They can do so only by causing pain to ordinary people. However,
the humanitarian impulse that causes rich states to pressure poor states to enter human rights
treaties also makes it difficult for them to follow through and punish the population, already poor
and miserable, if their country does not comply with the treaty. This problem has been dubbed
the Samaritan’s Dilemma.27
It should also be kept in mind that liberal countries rarely have a strong interest in
improving well-being in other countries. The governments of liberal countries stay in power by
providing benefits to voters, not to foreigners. Thus, governments give aid to foreigners only
when doing so benefits voters. This can happen for two reasons. First, voters care about the wellbeing of foreigners. No doubt they do, but it is equally clear that the well-being of foreigners is a
low priority for most people.28 Second, voters care about security and prosperity, and providing
help to foreigners advance these goals. Although sometimes it does, liberal governments have
discovered that they often do better along these dimensions by providing support to illiberal
states when they are strategically or economically important.
Nonetheless, the analysis I have sketched out provides a plausible explanation of
enforcement of international human rights law from a rational choice perspective. It is important
to note, however, that the model does not track the official understanding of human rights
27
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treaties. As written and generally understood in official and academic discussion, human rights
treaties place identical constraints on all states, which are jointly responsible for ensuring
compliance. I have, by contrast, emphasized distinct horizontal and vertical dimensions. The
horizontal dimension involves cooperation among a limited number of rich, liberal states; the
vertical dimension identifies their relationship with the target states.
It is also important to see that human rights treaties do not reflect the logic of reciprocity,
unlike the laws of war and (I have argued elsewhere) much of the rest of international law.29 If
one state violates a human rights treaty, other states do not have a right to violate the treaty—that
would not make any sense. Sweden would not torture its own citizens in order to punish Egypt
for torturing Egyptians. The type of direct reciprocity that works reasonably well in ensuring that
the laws of war are (often) respected is absent in the human rights regime, where states must
overcome a collective action problem and contend with the Samaritan’s dilemma.
This approach helps explain a number of empirical patterns. The first is the contrast
between compliance with the laws of war and compliance with human rights law. As we have
seen, compliance with the laws of war has been meaningful although far from perfect, and it
reflects the reciprocal nature of international legal enforcement. Compliance with human rights
law has been minimal.30 States generally do not improve their human rights records after they
29

See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005).
See Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights 165–345 (Cambridge 2009) (finding, generally, the effect of
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and International Institutions: The Effects of the Women’s Convention on Female Education, in Power,
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Bill of Rights”, 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 437, 449–56 (2009) (finding that ratification of ICCPR and its
Optional Protocol had no statistically significant impact on human rights practices three years after ratification, but
has a small positive correlation five years after ratification), Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming
and Shaming and the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 Int’l Org. 689, 703–06, 706 n. 44 (2008) (finding no
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J. Peace Res. 407, 415–22 (2007) (finding no statistically significant lagged relationship, or a negative one, in
countries that were repressive before ratifying the ICCPR or CAT), Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui,
Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 Am. J. Soc. 1373, 1396–1401 (2005)
(finding that the number of human rights treaties ratified and the duration of ratification of any particular treaty is
correlated with an increase in human rights abuses), Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties
Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. Conflict Resol. 925, 941–50 (2005) (finding that ratification of the
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enter human rights treaties. The major exception is the European Union’s success in encouraging
the human rights behavior of potential members. The EU has a great deal of leverage because
potential members benefit a great deal when they enter the union. The EU has also devised
institutional mechanisms for overcoming the collective action problem that would otherwise
hinder cooperation among its members.31
The second is the contrast between the recognized agreement on the meaning of the laws
of war and the riotous conflict over the meaning of human rights. Subject to fairly technical
disagreements, many arising out of the extent to which the 1970s protocols should be considered
part of the customary laws of war, and others arising out of understandably different parsings of
ambiguous clauses, states agree on what the laws of war require. By contrast, human rights is an
essentially contested concept.32 Everyone believes in “human rights” in the same way that
everyone believes in “liberty” or “democracy” or “fairness” or “justice.” The consensus on the
label masks disagreement about the meaning of the referent, as though moral disagreement were
just a matter of semantics. The United States treats human rights as essentially the American bill
of rights as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Europeans disagree in significant respects—
opposing the death penalty and other harsh criminal sanctions while having more limited
conceptions of freedom of expression and supporting a range of positive rights. Many Islamic

ICCPR and CAT was correlated with an increase in personal integrity violations; this increase was also found for
civil rights violations in autocratic countries, though the effect diminished and became a reduction for more
democratic countries), Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study 123–57 (2005) (finding
limited improvement of human rights in countries that ratify human rights treaties), Hathaway, supra note __, at
1989–2002 (finding that ratification of the ICCPR, CAT, the Genocide Convention, or CEDAW had either no
impact or detrimental impact on the human rights practices the respective treaties are meant to protect), Linda Camp
Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in
Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. Peace Res. 95, 110–12 (1999) (finding that ratification of the ICCPR has a
statistically insignificant relationship with measures of personal integrity and civil rights). Simmons’ book is the
most recent and celebrated of this work, and some people have taken from it the message that the earlier literature
was unduly pessimistic. But Simmons’ results are similar to that of earlier work: the overall effect of human rights
treaties is either nil or very small; even if transitional states are isolated, the effect is small (the coefficients in her
regressions), and it is not clear why human rights treaties should be evaluated on the basis of their effect on a subset
of states.
31
One other empirical finding is that the transitional states do improve some of their human rights behavior when
they enter treaties, unlike democratic and authoritarian states. The simplest explanation for this pattern is that states
undergoing transition both independently improve their treatment of citizens and ratify human rights treaties to
signal commitment to the new regime. Thus, the independent effect of the treaty ratification on human rights is
open to question. Many transitional states are western, suggesting that people in those states have human rights
preferences that are independent of treaty obligations. Many transitional states also have stable institutions, which
contribute to compliance.
32
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14

countries interpret human rights so that they are consistent with Islamic law, which means that
they reject human rights norms that require equal rights for women, that prohibit certain harsh
criminal punishments, and insist on robust religious toleration. China and other developing
countries advance the “right to development,” which excuses them from respecting political
rights that interfere with economic growth.33 There is no way to resolve these disagreements; it is
better to recognize that there are shifting human rights coalitions that advance largely (but not
entirely) different core values.

III. Institutions: A Comparison
One of the striking differences between human rights law and the laws of war is the
degree of institutionalization. Human rights law is thickly institutionalized. The laws of war are
supported by very few institutions. This difference might seem puzzling. One might normally
expect that more successful areas of law would have more robust institutions.
A sketch of the human rights institutions would mention the following organizations and
offices. The Human Rights Council, which replaced the Commission on Human rights in 2006,
monitors human rights in UN member states and issues resolutions condemning human rights
violations (which, however, have no legal force). In addition, the main human rights treaties
established bodies charged with the task of monitoring compliance with the treaties, interpreting
them, and developing them. These bodies include the Human Rights Committee (created by the
ICCPR), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (created by the ICESCR), the
Committee Against Torture (created by the CAT), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (created by CERD), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (created by CEDAW), and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (created by the
CRC). A number of other UN institutions have human rights-related responsibilities—for
example, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. And a High Commissioner for Human
Rights has the task of coordinating these different agencies and publicizing human rights abuses.
A further group of institutions have responsibility at the regional level. The three most
important are the European, Inter-American, and African systems. The Inter-American and
African systems have a Commission and a Court. The Commission monitors compliance with
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regional human rights treaties and typically plays an intermediary role between petitioners and
the Court—screening and providing assistance. The Court has jurisdiction over the regional
treaty, and can issue legally binding judgments against member states. The most developed of
the regional systems is the European system, which has 47 member states. Its busy court (an
earlier Commission was dropped) has issued thousands of judgments.
The laws of war, by contrast, are not created, monitored, or enforced by any international
legal institution. The sole institution with any authority over the laws of war is the International
Committee of the Red Cross.34 The ICRC is not an international organization in the ordinary
sense. It was not established by states; nor are its members or officials supplied by governments.
It is a private institution organized under Swiss law. (It does receiving funding from
governments, mainly western.) The ICRC derives legal authority from the Geneva Conventions
and their protocols, which oblige states to permit the ICRC to monitor prisoners of war. But
states have no authority over it; they do not set its mandate, for example, and they cannot exert
indirect control over it through appointees. In this way, the ICRC is different from all of the
human rights institutions. Yet it is far more successful than any of the human rights institutions
with the possible exception of the ECtHR.
One might expect international institutions that are established and operated by states to
have more power than private institutions, or that a highly institutionalized area of international
law would be more successful than a thinly institutionalized area of international law. But the
opposite is true. What accounts for this puzzling fact? The answer is that states established the
human rights institutions to overcome a collective action problem, while the ICRC fits into the
simple logic of reciprocity that undergirds the laws of war. The ICRC inserts itself between the
two belligerents at war, giving each a method to monitor the behavior of the other. The states
now have a commitment to permit the ICRC to meet POWs (among other things), and each state
will retaliate against the other state if it violates this commitment. The system can work as long
as the ICRC is committed to neutrality. Why exactly the members of the ICRC maintain those
commitments is not obvious, but a likely explanation is that the ICRC will cease to have any
function as soon as states stop trusting it. Its members will have to look for employment
elsewhere.
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Human rights institutions face a more difficult environment. The basic problem is that the
collective action problem that afflicts enforcement of human rights treaties also interferes, in a
second-order way, with attempts to create institutions to enforce or advance human rights.
Consider a group of states that enter a human rights treaty and also seek to establish an
institution that will monitor compliance with the treaty. The institution or agency must be staffed
by people chosen by the states, people who, by necessity, are given a certain degree of
discretion—to set an agenda, to allocate resources to fact-finding, to evaluate the facts. The
agency could be established as a court or as a committee or other institution; for current
purposes, its particular form does not matter. The states grant authority to the agency to evaluate
compliance.
Any grant of authority gives rise to agency costs. In our case, we might suppose that the
“principal”—the group of states—have some particular goal, namely, the enforcement of the
provisions of the human rights treaties. There may be more or less consensus about this goal;
often vague language is used to paper over differences. The agent obtains power from its ability
to set the agenda, and its private information—the facts that it learns about as it evaluates
member states.
The agent is a collectivity as well; it will typically consist of delegates from the member
states. States must appoint delegates, and it will not always be possible to find people whose
preferences perfectly align with those of the appointing states. There is also the problem that
states’ human rights preferences may change over time as governments are replaced. Finally,
aggregating preferences always involves some arbitrariness, with a great deal depending on
institutional design (for example, majority rule versus a consensus rule). For all these reasons,
the preferences of the agent are likely to diverge considerably from the preferences of the
principal.
The usual solution to agency problems is not available for international human rights
institutions. In business settings, principals can provide appropriate incentives to agents by
paying them more when agents succeed and less when they fail. Stock options, bonus pay, and
similar mechanisms can be used. But these mechanisms require an objective method for
evaluating the agents’ performance when the agents’ actual activities are invisible to the
principal. If the principal cannot observe whether the agent works hard or not, at least the
principal can observe the revenues that flow in. This is not the case for international human

17

rights institutions. When a human rights committee issues reports, it is difficult to evaluate them
without duplicating the effort, which would create new agency problems. Nor is there some
independent and objective measure that can be used to evaluate their performance.
Even when human rights organizations serve as perfect agents, they have no ability to
compel their principals to obey their judgments. Here, we see the collective action problem
again. If a human rights organization directs Zimbabwe to change its treatment of political
prisoners, and Zimbabwe refuses to do so, only other nation states can punish it. Yet other states
prefer to free ride, and so the sanction is likely to be weak or nonexistent.
For all these reasons, states have been reluctant to give human rights agencies authority
to issue binding legal judgments. Even where states agree on a particular human rights goal, they
cannot trust the agency to pursue it. Even when they can trust the agency, the states themselves
have trouble living up to their obligations to sanction other nations that are criticized by the
agency. The result is that human rights institutions are talking shops where little is accomplished.
Some of these problems are illustrated by the travails of the UN Human Rights Council,
which succeeded the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2006. The Commission on Human
Rights had some significant accomplishments; it drafted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, for example. But by the first decade of the 21st century, it had lost a great deal of
support. Chief among the complaints was that a large fraction of its 53 member states were
routine human rights abusers such as Libya and Sudan, and that the Commission rarely criticized
human rights abusers, focusing most of its attention on Israel. Thanks to some modest changes in
election procedures, the Human Rights Council has fewer rights-abusing members than the
Commission did (though still a substantial minority), but its record is no better. It continues to
focus its attention on Israel and a handful of other countries (Sudan and Myanmar), and to ignore
most other human-rights abusing countries. Consistent with the interest of developing states, the
Council avoids singling out states for criticism as much as possible, and instead has instituted a
toothless universal periodic review procedure. This procedure results in a document that makes
recommendations for reform but does not condemn states for human rights violations. Finally,
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the Council had advanced the controversial idea that “defamation of religion” violates human
rights.35
Both the Commission and the Council are essentially political bodies that do the bidding
of the member states. Because the member states need the support of other countries to be
elected, the only states that the Commission can directly criticize are those that are
internationally isolated—Israel, Sudan, Myanmar, and a handful of other states. Developing
countries with weak human rights records constitute a majority of countries in the world, and
therefore they have majority representation on the Council. It is in their interest to protect
themselves from official criticism by a UN body. The defamation of religion resolutions emerge
from a coalition of Arab, Muslim, developing, and authoritarian states that routinely outvote
western states.36 Other states have little incentive to employ sanctions to ensure that the
Council’s judgments are obeyed; even when they agree with the Council, they prefer to free ride.
The various regional human rights courts, unlike the Council and other UN human rights
bodies, have the power to issue legally binding judgments. Of these, only the European Court of
Human Rights has enjoyed a substantial degree of success. In 1950, the Council of Europe
drafted the European Convention on Human Rights, which today has 47 parties, including the 27
members of the European Union. The Convention creates a European Court of Human Rights,
which reviews petitions submitted by nationals of the member states. In thousands of cases, the
ECtHR has awarded judgments—typically fines accompanied by orders to national governments
requiring them to modify laws that violate the Convention. However, the extent to which the
ECtHR has affected the behavior of states is unknown. There is no doubt that some advanced
European states have changed their laws when required to by the ECtHR. However, Russia has
slid back into authoritarianism since it joined the ECtHR in 1998, and a general view is that
while states like Russia will pay penalties (which are typically small), they do not reliably
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change their laws (or enforce changes in the law) in response to adverse judgments. The sheer
size of its jurisdiction—many hundreds of millions of people across Europe and parts of Asia—
limits the impact of this 47-judge court, which today has an enormous backlog of cases, resulting
in long delays.
The ECtHR is a regional institution, not an international institution, and it no doubt
derives much of its power from the fact that most of its members belong to the EU and most of
the remaining members want to belong to the EU. This sets it apart from the other international
human rights institutions, which have had little impact on the behavior of states. The reason, as I
have emphasized, is that they cannot overcome the collective action problem and states’ weak
interests in the well-being of people in other states.
In sum, the ICRC is an effective institution because its role is consistent with the logic of
reciprocity that underlies the laws of war. The human rights organizations exist in a much less
favorable strategic environment. Constructed to overcome a collective action problem, but
themselves subject to the same collective action problem, they have no room for maneuver.37

IV. The U.S. Conflict with Al Qaeda and International Law
Many critics argued that the Bush administration wholly disregarded international law,
but this claim was always an exaggeration. The Bush administration took the laws of war
seriously even while it neglected human rights law. For a salient example, compare the treatment
of soldiers responsible for torture in Abu Ghraib and CIA agents responsible for torture of
members of Al Qaida in various places around the world. The U.S. government prosecuted and
disciplined those involved in Abu Ghraib, while immunizing the CIA agents. The Obama
administration has endorsed this policy and has paid little attention to continuing human rights
concerns—now focused on targeted killings by drones as well as the constraints on judicial
process for Al Qaeda defendants.
From a legal perspective, these different attitudes toward human rights law and the laws
of war are hard to explain. Both types of torture—of Iraqis and of members of Al Qaida—violate
the Convention Against Torture and the ICCPR. Under principles of international criminal law,
the United States had an obligation to prosecute both groups of torturers. But the strategic
settings were different. The U.S. military feared that torture of Iraqis would lead to erosion of the
37
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Geneva Conventions and possible retaliatory mistreatment of American soldiers, in this war or in
future wars.38 The U.S. government did not fear that Al Qaeda would retaliate against Americans
as a consequence of torture because Al Qaeda already disregarded every type of humanitarian
norm, and groups like it in future will as well.
The distinction makes some sense from a rational choice perspective.39 It also recalls the
history of the laws of war, and the many exceptions made when states battle non-state
organizations. A state gains nothing by complying with international law when there is no
reciprocity—and this is what undermined compliance with both human rights law and the laws
of war in the conflict with Al Qaeda. The case for complying with the laws of war, I have
argued, is stronger than the case for complying with human rights law.
There is, however, a further twist, which is that it is unclear whether the United States
gained much by trying to comply with the laws of war in Iraq after the rapid surrender of the
Iraqi army. The militias that continued to cause trouble did not themselves comply with the laws
of war, so the element of reciprocity was absent. It also seems doubtful that future belligerents
will violate the laws of war in conflicts with the United States because the United States violated
the laws of war in the earlier conflict with Iraq. Future belligerents will care about how the
United States treat their soldiers, not how the United States treated people from other countries
in earlier wars. On the other hand, it may well be reasonable to show restraint in one war in the
hope of obtaining reciprocal benefits in future wars with different countries so that norms of
conduct are clear and cooperation in future wars is therefore facilitated.
There is a possible argument that disregarding human rights law has harmed U.S.
reputation in a more general sense.40 The question is whether a country’s violation of some law
X will cause other countries to believe that the first country will violate some other law Y that
supports cooperation that the first country values.41 Some people argue that European countries
were reluctant to cooperate with the United States as a result of U.S. violations of human rights
38
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law, but the usual instances cited involve counterterror and military operations that the
Europeans understandably wanted no part of, not other dimensions of international cooperation
such as trade.
Economic models of reputation depend on private information. A relevant state is either a
“good type” or “bad type” in economic argot—meaning that it has hidden characteristics that
render it a more or less attractive cooperative partner to other states. Consider a closed state with
an institutional structure that enables government officials to make and keep commitments or
not. Other states may not know which is the case, and thus be reluctant to enter treaties with this
state until somehow the state signals its type. If the state manages to comply with norms of
international law against its own immediate interest, this visible pattern of behavior may
gradually reveal that the state belongs to the good type—that its institutions work well rather
than poorly. States that in this way develop a good reputation will be able to find partners in
international cooperative ventures; states with a bad reputation will have trouble finding partners
and will therefore be deprived of the gains of international cooperation.
This model may explain some aspects of compliance with international law, but it seems
to be a poor one for explaining the behavior of open societies like the United States. Officials in
a foreign state can learn more about the United States by reading American newspapers than by
waiting for it to comply with or violate international law.

Conclusion
Reciprocity has always been at the heart of international law. States create international
law for the sake of reciprocal gains, and they comply with international law so that those gains
are not lost. The logic of reciprocity can be understood using simple game theoretical models,
which show that it is the key to self-enforcement in the repeated bilateral prisoner’s dilemma.
But if reciprocity can support certain forms of international cooperation, it also puts a limit on
how much international cooperation can accomplish. The logic of reciprocity suggests that
international law will be most robust when states cooperate in pairs or in small numbers and
those states have advanced political institutions.42
However, in the twentieth century nations sought more ambitious forms of international
law that could generate greater international cooperation. The impulse was humanitarian. People
42
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were morally uneasy with reprisals and other forms of collective punishment, and sought to
control them. The restrictions in the Geneva Conventions replaced collective punishment with a
criminal justice approach. The human rights treaties went farther, forbidding states to engage in
any abuse of their own citizens as well as of foreigners. Both developments, however, were in
tension with the reciprocal logic of self-enforcement. The restrictions in the Geneva Convention,
if respected by one state, would weaken the incentive of the other state to comply with the
substantive provisions in the Geneva Convention because the punishment for violations would be
limited. The human rights treaties rejected reciprocity altogether, and implicitly relied on a
handful of liberal states for enforcement. The limited success of these efforts suggests that states
have not yet overcome the historical limits on international cooperation.
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